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The leading feature of the second part of the volume is the fullness of detail with which the partizan warfare of 1780 in the upper counties is described. By no other writer has this part of the subject been treated with such minuteness. The outbreak of this conflict was due to the issue of orders by the British, after the state had been practically conquered, which compelled all to choose between imprisonment and active service on the side of the King. This effort artificially to stimulate loyalism, taken in connection with the brutality and greed of the English soldiery, forced the entire northern part of the state into insurrection. By the unaided efforts of the people, under leaders many of whom had no commissions, the progress of the British was checked, and the effects of the American defeat at Camden largely overcome. This proved the turning point of the war in the south, if not throughout the continent, and at least saved the South from ultimate submission to England. This explains the reason for the emphasis laid by the author on this phase of the subject, and for what he declares will be his continued insistence upon it when, in his next volume, he undertakes to describe the campaign of Greene.

With the above is connected a theory, elaborated in Chapter XIV. and elsewhere, to the effect that Washington, and the leaders of the Revolution in its early stages in South Carolina, were wrong in insisting that the chief dependence should be placed on a regular army, raised, paid and organized after the European model. This form of military force, the writer believes, was not suited to American conditions, and has been to a large extent abandoned by the United States in its later wars. What was needed instead was "an organization in which men of the highest character may serve in the ranks from patriotism, regardless of pay; an organization which, formed by enlistment for definite periods—sometimes for a whole war—combines the permanence of a regular force with the superior zeal and character of the patriot." South Carolina, in the opinion of the author, affords a vivid illustration of what may be accomplished by spontaneous popular effort. But it may be suggested that Washington's system made ample provision for the voluntary service of patriots, if they would only enlist in sufficient numbers and for sufficiently long periods of time. The fact is, a people cannot be depended on to do what was accomplished in South Carolina, or in Prussia during the War of Liberation, except under extraordinary pressure, when their homes and lives are actually imperilled. No sweeping conclusions can be drawn from such exceptional conditions. Other provision must be made for the continuous work of defense.

HERBERT L. OSGOOD.

Loyalism in New York During the American Revolution. By ALEXANDER CLARENCE FLICK, PH.D. (New York: The Columbia University Press; The Macmillan Co. 1901. Pp. 282.)

THE appearance of an unprejudiced and scientifically constructed work upon the subject of the Tory in the American Revolution is gratifying

to all who wish a right understanding of our national genesis. The author has approached his subject with a desire to know the truth, even though the results of his investigation may humble his pride in the patriotism of his ancestors. The work has been done in a careful and scholarly manner, but certain conclusions have been reached which do not seem justified by the evidence presented.

For example, Dr. Flick finds the origin of the Loyalist party in the aristocrats of 1689, the faction that opposed Leisler. This seems to be a mistake, for it can not be shown, I think, that these distinctions of the earlier revolution persisted for seventy-five years or more. It is true that there had been parties in the colonial history of New York, and doubtless their opposing leaders came from the same classes as the leaders of the Revolutionary parties; but the rank and file beyond question joined one party or the other only on the spur of the moment, influenced by some trifle, by personal spite, obstinacy, economic interest or by the influence of friends and family connections; their motives were in the main without roots in the past.

It is doubtful also whether, as the author asserts, "the colonial parties were primarily religious and social." In what purports to be a summary of the forces and influences which laid the foundation for the Loyalist party (p. 14), the economic causes are omitted though they are indicated elsewhere. As a matter of fact, he shows by his own accumulation of facts that economic interests more frequently determined party sympathy than did the religious or social influences. Even those who appear as religious champions were influenced by economic considerations. Many persons were dependent for their stipends upon the English Church; Anglican ministers led in pamphlet writing because they were defending their pecuniary interests, not because their religion was attacked. In brief, Dr. Flick seems to have laid too much emphasis upon the assertion that loyalism had a religious and political side; that men were loyal because the Anglican religion forbade rebellion and commanded submission in the last resort.

Of the social status of the Loyalist, Dr. Flick says that there were all grades of worth and unworthiness; royal officers, large landed proprietors, professional classes, wealthy commercial classes, conservative farmers, colonial politicians, and the conservative masses. He speaks of the official class as the nucleus about which the Loyal party rallied. The assertion is not quite accurate; the official class would naturally have formed the center of opposition to the Whigs, but they were in fact ineffective in staying the progress of the Revolution, because they failed to act without awaiting the initiative from the mother country. Moreover the nationality of the Tories is described as being in a "vast majority" English. This seems to be disputed by facts upon which the author has put some emphasis; the large number of Scotch in the Mohawk Valley, the Dutch of Long Island and New York City, made a large fraction of the loyal population. The lists of Tory names contained in the manuscript—"Transcript of Books and Papers of American Loyalists"—show a good proportion of men not English in origin.

The activity of the Tories is well portrayed. Their public protests against the progress of rebellion mark the earlier stages. Later they enlisted with the British, or formed militia companies, or fitted out privateers to help "free themselves with the aid of the Royal troops," as they expressed it. In New York Governor Tryon was very active in this work. As many as 15,000 Loyalists seem to have been enlisted in the British army, while 8,500 entered the loyal militia. This is compared with the 41,633 soldiers who joined the patriot ranks during the Revolution.

Dr. Flick has made an estimate of the number of Loyalists and has studied carefully the methods in which they were treated by their victorious opponents. He estimates the number of Loyalists in New York at 90,000, of whom 35,000 were exiled, while the rest accepted the new conditions and remained. At the beginning the Tories were variously maltreated by the mob; afterwards they were customarily brought before an inquisitorial commission of some sort, the Continental Congress, the Provincial Congress, a general committee on Tories, county or district committees. Those who were found guilty of aiding the enemy in any way were, on conviction, disarmed, outlawed, and compelled to retract, fined or similarly punished. Confiscation of property was also resorted to, and the author declares that the funds realized from confiscation in the state approximated 3,150,000 dollars in Spanish coin. The book likewise contains an elaborate treatment of the emigration of the Loyalists and of the compensation granted them by the British government.

It must be said that the author seems on the whole to have confined his exposition too much to the hard, concrete facts of the history, without giving enough attention to the spirit which animated the partizans. He does not exhibit their passions, their bigotry, their fierce zeal, their intolerance and abiding hatred. But the tone of the work is fair, and there is throughout the whole an atmosphere of trained scientific accuracy and of patience in thorough investigation. The proof reading was carelessly done, but such minor faults do not conceal a scholarly method of work.

C. H. VAN TYNE.

The Life and Correspondence of Rufus King, Comprising his Letters, Private and Official, his Public Documents and his Speeches. Edited by his grandson, CHARLES R. KING. Volume VI., 1816-1827. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1900. Pp. 729.)

THE sixth and concluding volume of this series, covering a period of eleven years, or the "era of good feeling," is, as were the previous ones, remarkably full on the political side of our history, and curiously lacking in any other interests. In one of his letters, King dwells on the intellectual poverty of his country, remarking "the truth is we have no scholars," and his own correspondence, with its absolute absorption in politics, but bears out his statement and serves to illustrate the limitations